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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Robert Cason, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action in the 
District Court by filing a document labeled “Notice of Appeal,” in which he sought review 
of an adverse state-court judgment.  The District Court liberally construed the filing, which 
reads like an appellate brief, as a complaint; screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1915(e)(2)(B); and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.1  Cason timely appealed.  We will affirm.2 
In his brief and supplemental briefs on appeal, Cason does not challenge the District 
Court’s reliance on Rooker-Feldman to dismiss the case.  In fact, he does not appear to 
challenge the dismissal at all, but instead repeats and embellishes his arguments for why 
the state-court judgment should be reversed, ostensibly treating this appeal as a direct 
appeal of the state-court proceedings.  Because Cason does not set forth any specific 
argument as to how the District Court erred, he has effectively forfeited any challenge to 
the District Court’s ruling.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 
969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that claims were forfeited where appellant 
failed to raise them in her opening brief); see also Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther 
 
1 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923). 
 
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the dismissal of the 
complaint is de novo.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); cf. Turner 
v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (exercising 




Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have consistently refused 
to consider ill-developed arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the 
appellate briefing.”).  Although we construe Cason’s pro se filings liberally, this policy 
does not prevent us from applying this doctrine to his appeal.3  See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel 
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4  
 
 
3 In any event, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a district court of jurisdiction to 
review, in some circumstances, state-court adjudications.  See Turner, 449 F.3d at 547.  It 
is a narrow doctrine, “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  As the District 
Court explained, Cason’s complaint falls squarely in the category of cases barred by 
Rooker-Feldman from review in federal court.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine deprives lower federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals 
from state-court judgments).  
 
4 Cason has filed in this Court two motions, captioned as though they were filed in the 
District Court.  One is for leave to file a memorandum of law in support of his motion for 
default judgment, and the other is for leave to amend the “complaint/brief.”  To the extent 
that he asks us to rule on these motions, we deny them.  Cason does not appear to have a 
motion for default judgment pending in this case. 
